Abstract
Introduction
Cassava is the important agricultural product in Thailand due to the fact that cassva has effects in agricutural sector and the linkages to manufactures as well. Recent agricultural implemented policy related to cassava were income guarantee scheme versus pledging scheme. The schemes were launched by two opposite political parties in Thailand. On the other hand cassava is important to Thailand since Thailand is the first major cassava exporter of the world. Eventhough the major produce cassava of the world are Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia Thailand and Congo. Most of them produce for domestic consupmtion. While Thailand 68% of cassava product are for export as shown in figure 1. Cassava from farm would be produced for ethanol, pellets and powder.
They composed of 5% as ethanol, 8% pellets for domestic consumption, 32% pellets for export, 19% powder for domestic consumption and 36% powder for export. 
Source: Thai Tapioca Starch Association

Literature Review
As importance of cassava to Thailand, this study emphasized 2 main components: supply response of cassava and co-integration of cassava prices. There were several literatures related to these topics. Salassi(1995) 
Objectives
The objectives of this study were to:
1) compare farmer's perception regarding different schemes 2) calculate breakeven price of cassava production 3) analyze supply respond of cassava production 4) analyze co-integration on cassava prices
Methodology Data
The primary data on farmers' perception regarding two different rice schemes. The research interviewed farmers in Nakornratchasima province. Secondary data were used for break even analysis, supply respond and cointegration analysis on prices. Monthly data on farm price, wholesale price and 
Analysis
The research would compare farmer's perception regarding to different schemes: income guarantee scheme and pledging scheme. Income guarantee scheme performance of cassava in Thailand during 2009-2011 was shown. 
Cassava break-even analysis
P = cassava farm price (USD/ton) Q = cassava yield (ton/acre) F = cassava fixed cost (USD/ton) V = cassava variable cost (USD/ton) (P X Q)=F + (V X Q) P =(F/Q)+V 2. Cassava supply respond model ) , , , ( 1 D C P A f A t i t t     t A cassava
Co-integration analysis
The study estimated cassava price transmission from different levels using unit root and co-integration methods. Market co-integration involves a test of price efficiency by examining how market in different regions responds jointly to supply and demand forces. Each cassava price series are tested for the order of integration to determine which variables are stationary and non-stationary in levels. The Augmented Dickey and Fuller test (ADF) developed by Fuller (1979 and 1981) was used for a unit root test for all variables. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if variable is stationary. To elaborate a long-term relationship between cassava farm price and cassava wholesale price and cassava F.O.B. price, the two step procedure of Engle and Granger (1987) was employed. First a simple linear model is estimated using ordinary least square and then the residues were tested for stationary. Then the Johansen co-integration test, based on the Dickey-Fuller procedure, determines the number of co-integration equation. Co-integration methods are useful when time series data are non-stationary and conventional model would encounter the problem of spurious regression (Harris, 1995) Long run co-integration
Results and Discussion
By interview 103 farmers in Sungsang district, Nakornratchasima province-in the Northeastern region, 83.50% of farmers grow cassava, depending on rain. Farmers grow cassava once a year for 12 month period. 49.51% of farmers received the loan from Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). In 2009/2010, farmers sold cassava at the average of baht 2,750 per metric ton. They received the difference price compensation for baht 582.62 per metric ton (total of USD18.20). Farmers preferred income guarantee scheme to pledging scheme at 84.31%. Due to the reason that income guarantee scheme had fewer procedures than pledging scheme. Farmers could sell their product at any price level when they wanted.
In addition after register as growers they could receive the difference even when the crop was lost by disease or flood. Table 2 shows the performance of income guarantee scheme for cassava in Thailand during 2010-2011. Total cassava farmers involved in Income Guarantee policy during 2010-2011 were 391,000 farmers and there were the maximum 247,000 farmers in the northeast of Thailand. Total government budget used for the policy was USD million 78.48 and each farmer received the payment approximately USD206.26. 
Break even analysis and supply respond analysis
Source: Office of Agricultural Economic and calculated
For the period of 1998-2011, fixed cost per acre increased slightly but variable cost per acre increased from USD 81.64 in 1998 to USD 362.82 in 2011. Growth rate of total cost increased from 40% in 2001 to 73% in 2010 but growth rate reduced to only 9%. This corresponded to the fact that Thai farmers depended more on machine, herbicide and hired labor than in the past. It was obviously a burden on cost.
In the year 2001 production, variable cost and fixed cost were USD 16.28 and USD 2.33 per metric ton and these costs increased to USD 43.33 and USD 5.73 in 2010. Yield increased slightly from 7.01 metric ton per acre in 2001 to 7.51 metric ton per acre in 2010. Table 5 shows Thai cassava productions during 2001 to 2010 were above breakeven prices farmer received except in year 2001. It is mainly because of the low price received in 2001 and the increase of prices due to alternative energy boom of cassava. Factors determined cassava supply were cultivated area in the previous year and cassava price in the previous year. Cassava price had related to government policy and alternative energy policy. Therefore for Thai farmers price was the major factor determining cultivated area.
Unit root test and co-integration analysis
Unit root test
The first step is to determine which variables are stationary and non-stationary in levels. Unit root test in table 4 showed that all variables are non-stationary and stationary at first different with constant and trend. 
Co-integration analysis
Farm price was positively affected by wholesale price and F.O.B. price. The estimated coefficients associated with explanatory variable agreed with a priori expectations, and were statistically significant at 1% or 5% levels. Signs of all estimated coefficients agreed with expectations and were statistically significant (table 5) .
Long run co-integration
Long run coefficients of farm price and wholesale pellet price and long run coefficients of farm price and F.O.B. powder price were 0.3655 and 0.1963, respectively. That indicated that if a price of wholesale pellet changed by 1 baht (Thai currency) then farm price would change by 0.3655 baht in the same direction. Similarly, if F.O.B. powder price changed by 1 baht (Thai currency) then farm price would change by 0.1953 baht at the same direction
Short run co-integration
Short run coefficients of farm price and wholesale pellet price and short run coefficients of farm price and F.O.B. powder price were 0.2926 and 0.2312, respectively. This indicated that if wholesale pellet price changed by 1 baht then farm price would change by 0.2926 baht at the same direction.
The ECM coefficient suggested that the speed of adjustment of the model was 15.70%. The negative sign implied that the adjustment would cause the system to gradually convert to equilibrium. Similarly, if F.O.B. price changed by 1 baht then farm price would change by 0.2312 baht at the same direction. The ECM coefficient suggested that the speed of adjustment of the model was 41.35%. The negative sign implied that the adjustment would cause the system to gradually convert to equilibrium. 
Summary and conclusion
Farmers preferred income guarantee scheme to pledging scheme since cassava is not seasonal therefore farmers could sell their product at any price level when they wanted.
In addition rules of income guarantee scheme after register as growers they could receive the difference even when the crop was lost. Since 2003, farm prices had increased above breakeven price. Supply response of cassava mainly depended on price received in the previous year. This price related to government policy in two different schemes: income guarantee scheme and pledging scheme. Cassava in addition has been used as alternative energy. This study applied co-integration analysis for farm price with wholesale price and F.O.B. price for cassava. Farm price was positively affected by wholesale price with 0.7862 R 2 . Farm price was also a positively affected by F.O.B. price with 0.9069R 2 . The estimated coefficients associated with explanatory variable agreed with a priori expectations, and were statistically significant. Signs of all estimated coefficients agreed with expectations and were statistically significant.
